Governments and communities must develop civil defense capabilities
Reflecting on civil defense in the new geopolitical world in which we live is no longer a question, but an obligation.
For decades in Canada, public safety has been built around an implicit assumption: major crises would be accidental, natural, or technological, but rarely intentional and even less existential.
Floods, storms, power outages, pandemics. Serious events, sometimes dramatic, but part of a logic of risk management and a return to normalcy.
This framework of thinking is not the result of chance. Unlike many European countries, Canada and the United States have never experienced, in the modern era, the occupation of their territory, the systematic destruction of their civil institutions, or the lasting disorganization of their society by a foreign power.
The collective experience of war, the collapse of the state, or survival under occupation is not part of our contemporary memory.
Even at the height of the Cold War, whether during the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) or the ongoing tensions with the former USSR (1947-1991), the conflict remained, for the most part, theoretical, strategic, and deterrent.
The threat existed, but it remained distant. It never resulted in a direct and prolonged challenge to civilian life on Canadian and Quebec territory. Today, this strategic comfort deserves to be questioned. Not in an alarmist way, but with lucidity.
A more unstable world, but above all a different one
The current geopolitical context is not characterized solely by increased international tensions. It is distinguished above all by the nature of the confrontations. Modern conflicts are no longer limited to traditional battlefields.
They now unfold in critical infrastructure, cyberspace, the economy, information, energy and social cohesion.
Attacks are not necessarily aimed at occupying territory, but at weakening it. At testing its limits. At exploiting its dependencies. To gradually erode citizens’ trust in their institutions, particularly through disinformation.
In this context, the boundaries between civil security, national security, and defense are becoming more integrated. Civilian populations, municipalities, businesses, and essential services find themselves on the front line, often without having fully integrated this into their planning frameworks and response capabilities.
This is not a science fiction scenario. It is a trend that has been observable for several years now, and even more markedly in recent months and days.
Civil security: A robust framework… but incomplete
Let’s be clear: the civil security and civil protection systems in place in Canada and North America are generally well organized.
Although there is room for improvement due to the scale of disasters, they have proven their worth in the face of natural disasters, industrial accidents, and health crises. Emergency plans, business continuity, command structures, and coordination mechanisms are fairly well established.
But these systems are based on a key assumption: that events are one-off, unintentional, non-hostile, with a response phase followed by a return to normal.
But what happens when the crisis is no longer one-off? When the disruptions are multiple, simultaneous, and prolonged? When the threat is intentional, adaptive, and seeks less immediatedestruction than the gradual erosion of the system?
This is where thinking about civil defense takes on its full meaning.
Civil defense: a charged word, but a legitimate question
The term can be disturbing. For some, it evokes militarization or a return to the logic of the past. However, in several European countries, civil defense is not synonymous with fear, but with collective preparation.
It is part of a culture where history has shown that civil societies can be directly exposed to systemic and lasting crises. Switzerland, for example, has never stopped preparing itself.
It is part of a culture where history has shown that civil societies can be directly exposed to systemic and long-lasting crises. Switzerland, for example, has never stopped preparing itself.
Talking about civil defense today does not necessarily mean preparing to man the barricades. It means asking ourselves a simple but fundamental question: Do we collectively have the capacity to hold out over time if our usual points of reference are weakened?
- Holding out means continuing to provide essential services
- Holding out means maintaining social cohesion.
- Holding out means preserving the capacity for decision-making, communication, and governance, even in a deteriorated context.
When reflections is needed
The question does not call for a binary answer. It calls for reflection.
- Have we reached a point where risk management and diplomacy alone are no longer enough?
- Have we reached a point where we need to supplement civil security with broader reflection on societal, informational, and organizational resilience?
- Have we reached the point where we recognize that the absence of historical experience of occupation or war on our soil is a cognitive vulnerability?
Asking these questions is answering them by the very fact of asking them.
An opportunity for governance, not a threat
Approaching civil defense from a modern perspective is above all an opportunity. An opportunity to strengthen governance, coordination between public and private actors, the preparedness of organizations and the adaptability of communities.
It is not a question of transforming our societies, but of making them more aware, more resilient, and more agile in the face of the uncertainty generated by the various threats to which we are exposed.
The world is changing rapidly. So are the forms of crises. The real question is perhaps not whetherwe have reached this point, but whether we are ready to think collectively about what this implies without being alarmist, without naivety, and above all with lucidity.
What do you think? Should we, as a society, engage in a process aimed at providing our communities with a civil defense plan?
